
THE USSR IN THE 1930s: “THE FIGHT AGAINST THE GERMAN NATIONALISM”

By A.A. German

On 3 November 1917 the Bolsheviks issued a “Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” that granted national minorities the right of self-identification including separation and establishing independent states. This was an attempt to win over the non-Russian population and facilitate the expansion of the revolutionary process in Russia. In reality, the national idea, the notion of a national identity and devotion to national interests, had always been considered by the Bolsheviks as the main obstacle toward socialist and communist universalism and proletariat internationalism. It was an ideology that defined their political approach to the question of nationalism.

Russian Germans, along with many other non-Russian peoples, were granted territorial identity in the form of an oblast (in 1918) and later the Republic of Volga Germans (in 1924),¹ and established a number of German national districts and village Soviets.² In the 1920s, German language educational and cultural institutions were opened, local leadership was promoted, and the “Korenization”³ (Indigenization) campaign was initiated, a policy of power aimed at strengthening the role of the German language in all spheres of public life as the national “titular” or native language. This was followed by forced modernization of the economy in the 1930s. But in essence, German autonomy, like the autonomies of all the other national minorities, lacked political sovereignty; in reality, all the proclaimed national state rights were fiction. The above-mentioned tendency became especially pronounced in the middle of the 1930s when gradual departure from the concept of world revolution and commitment to building socialism in the country led to profound changes in national policy, and toward language in particular.

The Russian language became the only universal means of communication.⁴ The Korenization campaign which had been sluggish from the start was over. It was replaced by a fight against “local” nationalism, a

campaign that headed in the opposite direction. All the national minorities, especially those with their own autonomy, experienced the consequences of this new policy.

However, “the fight against German nationalism” was exceedingly violent and relentless. The reason was that the Germans of Russia had a historic connection with Germany. In the 1930s relations between the two countries were strained, and Germany was considered a potential adversary of the Soviet state. Besides, the Soviet Germans, like all the national minorities, were victims of the Bolshevik regime’s social experiments that resulted in the deterioration of their situation. Some of them tried to find a way out by seeking help from their historical Motherland (relocation to Germany, getting financial and moral support from abroad, etc.) Such actions by “their own” Germans received a highly negative reaction from Soviet authorities because these actions discredited the Bolshevik regime in the eyes of the world community, revealed the realities of the “workers’ and peasants’ state,” and undermined the relations of the USSR with Germany and other countries. In other words, these actions “played into the hand of world imperialism.”

This is what happened at the beginning of the 1930s. It is well documented that due to the collectivization and requisitioning of food from peasants, another mass famine occurred that impacted millions of Soviet people, especially in the Ukraine and the Volga area, including Russian Germans. Despite all the contrivances of Soviet authorities, the truth about hardships of the population in affected areas spread beyond the USSR borders. One of the first countries to receive news about the tragic situation of Germans in the USSR was Germany. There were many family connections among Germans of the two countries, and even with all the obstacles inflicted by the Stalin regime, letters from Russia reached relatives abroad. In addition, the population of the USSR included many

German nationals who had arrived at different periods of time and did not have Soviet citizenship.

The events in the USSR caused great concern among the public and authorities in Germany. Historically, this coincided with the period when Nazis were coming to power. Trying to win over German national support, the Nazi party actively joined the anti-Soviet campaign that was escalating on rumors that the famine in the USSR had been engineered by the Bolsheviks. Several diplomatic statements were issued. German diplomats in Moscow and Berlin were warning about “the misfortunes of the German colonists,” especially subjects of Germany, and urging the Soviet government to give permission for the German population of Russia to receive food assistance from Germany.⁵

The Soviets hypocritically denied the existence of the famine in the USSR and refused any such help. Because of the deteriorating situation in Russia brought by the famine, German diplomacy took more decisive steps. In March 1933, several German political leaders publicly accused Soviet authorities of hiding the truth about the worsening famine in their country. In June of 1933, an exhibition of letters from starving Russia Germans was organized in Berlin and caused considerable shock.⁶

The protest against “the starving of the German minority” in the USSR reached its apogee in July 1933. A number of organizations (German Red Cross, The Supreme Council of Evangelical Churches, The Union of Germans Abroad, and others.) appealed to the German nation to raise funds for the “suffering Germans” of the USSR. For this purpose, a special account, “Brothers in Need,” was opened in German banks; among the first contributors were the President of Germany, Paul von Hindenburg, and the Chancellor of Germany, Adolf Hitler, who made deposits of 1000 DM each. The German government assigned 17 million DM in relief assistance for the Soviet Germans. The Nazi leaders expertly used the Soviet authorities’ “conspiracy of silence” regarding the famine to exploit German nationalism and win over the German nation.⁷

Soviet authorities kept denying the reality of the famine in their country. They claimed that the campaign in Germany was based on slander. In the middle of July, as an answer to the accusations from Germany, a counter campaign was initiated in the USSR in which the Soviet

Germans expressed their “indignation” about the “lies of the fascist propaganda.” Resolutions of protest were signed at meetings held at enterprises, collective and socialist farms, machine-and-tractor stations, schools, offices of the ASSR of the Volga Germans, and German districts in different parts of the USSR. All the Soviet German language newspapers published these resolutions on their front pages.

The rhetoric of the protests was the same: Soviet Germans did not want any help from fascist Germany which “was going through a really difficult period of hunger and need.” “Letters from workers” that flooded the central Communist party and Soviet organs were published in the press and declared that under no circumstances would the authors of the letters accept parcels from “German fascists.” At the same time “workers” expressed willingness to collect food for the victims of the fascism, “unemployed and starving peasants of Germany,” which reversed the situation and the narrative. In August, the Executive Committee of Comintern (Communist International) published a brochure, “Brothers in Need?” that was circulated abroad. Its pages were filled with the same “workers’ and peasants’ letters” from Soviet Germans writing about their “prosperous and happy life.” At the same time, a book, “Our Answer,” with similar content⁸ was distributed for “domestic use.”

Along with this, newspapers in the USSR started publishing more material exposing the terror that was directed at Communists, Social Democrats, Jews and clergy in Germany. It could be that these revelations, along with firm counter political initiatives and possible secret collusion between the two totalitarian regimes, contributed to the fact that the anti-Soviet campaign in Germany soon started to fade away. But sympathy for the Soviet Germans that was born in Germany and spread to other countries was the decisive factor that eventually forced Soviet leaders to lift various bans on assistance from foreign countries. Although the official aid from Germany was still rejected, private help to individuals was now allowed. At the end of 1933, the German population of the USSR began receiving food parcels and money transfers in German marks and US dollars.⁹

Although Soviet authorities let Soviet Germans benefit from foreign relief efforts, the constraints on the

German population inside the country were tightened even further. On 5 November 1934, the Communist Party Central Committee sent a special directive to the Communist Party leadership of all the republics and territories. The directive brought to their attention that “anti-Soviet elements have recently become more active and are openly operating in German populated areas. Yet local party organizations and the NKVD [People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs] officials have been reacting with complacency, wrongly believing that in the interest of our foreign policy we should indulge the Germans or other nationalities of the USSR and let them get away with being disloyal to Soviet authority.” The directive further declared that “the Central Committee of the Communist Party considers this line of reasoning by the Communist organizations and NKVD agencies absolutely wrong and recommends that repressive measures including arrests and deportations of active counterrevolutionaries and anti-Soviet elements be taken and instigators be executed.” The directive specifically emphasized that local authorities “should require the German population to end all communication with foreign bourgeois and fascist organizations and stop receiving any money or packages.”¹⁰

Following the directive, a propaganda campaign aimed at forming negative public opinion about “fascist help” and its recipients was unleashed in newspapers, on the radio, and locally. Those who received and distributed humanitarian aid were labeled “fascists” and those who used it – “fascists’ accomplices.” Rejecting aid and destroying parcels was initiated and widely promoted. “On request of German workers and peasants,” foreign currency that came from abroad was transferred to the account of the International Organization for Helping Fighters of the Revolution (MOPR). In addition, during this period of time, unprecedented pressure was put on residents of the USSR who were subjects of foreign countries to become Soviet citizens.¹¹

The campaign of moral and physical terror launched against the Soviet Germans had the desired effect. People who were deprived of all rights and lived in constant fear were easily forced into obeying the authorities. But it was not enough to refuse foreign assistance, people had to “expose” one another. At village meetings in which all the residents were obliged to participate “fascist agents were uncovered,” and the

recipients of the “fascist help” repented and confessed that they “had betrayed their Socialist Motherland.” At every such meeting a resolution was passed that in most cases “demanded” that the “fascists” were tried in court.¹²

The active search for fascist counterrevolutionary organizations started. According to NKVD reports, “fascists” literally flooded the Volga German Republic, German districts, and villages of other areas of the country. They “infiltrated” local authorities’ organizations, collective farms, machine and tractor stations (MTS), factories, “built their nests” in universities, colleges and schools; and newspaper editorial offices and cultural institutions “were littered” with them. Mass repressions followed. On 15 January 1935, the NKVD Administration of the Volga German Republic informed the Oblast Committee of the Communist Party that since the beginning of the campaign (just over two months) it had “eliminated the fascist element” in the number of 187 individuals. In the Nemetsky (German) Rayon of the West Siberian Region, 193 people had been arrested by 19 December 1934. Afterwards the number of arrested did not decrease. In 1935, 24,900 Germans were subjected to repressions in the Ukraine. The majority of those arrested were sentenced to death.¹³ By the end of 1935, practically no humanitarian aid from abroad reached the Soviet Germans, but repressions against this national group continued.

The campaign against “German nationalism” targeted the autonomy of the Soviet Germans and their rights to self-governance were gradually shrinking. Articles of the 1926 and 1937 Constitutions of the Volga German ASSR granting limited sovereignty were ignored and by the end of the 1930s all the German National Districts in the USSR were liquidated. The German language was increasingly replaced by Russian in state and Communist Party organizations, and in institutions of the Volga German Republic and German National Districts. German nationals who occupied prominent party and state positions (the first and second secretaries of Regional Communist Party Committees, Canton Communist Party Committees, District Communist Party Committees, and NKVD executives) were demoted to lower ranks that held no real power (the third secretaries, leaders of Soviets

organs, etc.).

By 1937, it was obvious that the Central Committee of the Communist Party completely distrusted the German national cadre. After the First Secretary of the Regional Communist Party Committee, Eugen Frescher, was dismissed and arrested, it was the first time since the Civil War that a non-German (Jacob Popok) was nominated for the post. Germans lost their majority in the new Bureau of the Regional Communist Party Committee. National representation of the delegates to the 20th Regional Communist Party Conference shows the same tendency. Out of 270 voting delegates, there were 69 Germans, 159 Russians, and 33 Ukrainians.¹⁴ The year 1937 was a nightmare for the “people’s enemies.” On 19 January 1937 the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a resolution “On the German Regional Committee of the CPSU” that castigated the party leadership of the German Republic for mistakes in their work. The main accusations included letting “alien elements” penetrate the party, state and economic organizations which led to “nationalistic” and “fascist” manifestations.¹⁵ This document, in essence, authorized an appalling campaign of arrests, interrogations, tortures and executions of nearly all the leaders of the German Republic, including Canton and local authorities.

In the summer of 1937, during the so called “German Operation,”¹⁶ an underground nationalist fascist organization in the German Republic was “uncovered.” The mission of the “organization” was to demolish the Soviet regime, help Germany in preparing for war against the USSR, and sabotage the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. Among the leadership core of the “organization” were practically all the current and former party and Soviet leaders of the German Republic (Eugen Frescher, Adam Welsch, Heinrich Luft, Johannes Schwab, Wilhelm Kurz, Heinrich Fuchs, G. Klinger, Alexander Moor, A. Schneider, Christian Horst, J. Schönfeld, Heinrich König, and others). Hundreds of people were arrested, not only in the German Republic but all over the country. The majority were CPSU and Soviet leaders and German intellectuals. All the “organization leaders” were tried by special tribunals called “troika” and executed in 1937-1938, others received long-term sentences.¹⁷

At the beginning of the campaign, between 1933 and

beginning of 1935, only those who received and distributed foreign aid were classified as “fascists,” but eventually this label was applied to all the “people’s enemies” who were “exposed” in the German Republic. These included local “nationalists,” “Trotskyists,” “Rightists,” “saboteurs” and others. This was meant to reflect the national distinction of the “enemies” within the ASSR and hint that this was the source of, and served as a breeding ground for, the “counterrevolution.” From the political arena the “struggle with fascists” moved to the cultural sphere in the form of a vicious attack on any manifestation of national identity in the day-to-day life of Soviet Germans.

In 1934 the national policy of the Stalin regime toward the Soviet Germans started to change, while the inconsistent “Korenization” campaign faded out. An attitude of mistrust and enmity started to prevail. Stalin and his inner circle had serious suspicions that the rise of Hitler’s power meant that the German Republic and German National Districts would become “the strongholds of fascist support.” The fear of a “fifth column” was the motivation for a policy of brutal suppression of the rights, freedoms and national identity of the German population that culminated in 1937. This policy caused serious damage to the Volga Germans, especially to their national culture.

After receiving the Communist Party Central Committee directive of 5 November 1934, the Central Committees of the Republic’s Regions and Districts with German populations followed by issuing similar directives. In particular, the following resolutions were issued by the Communist organs of the Volga German Autonomous republic: “On the strengthening of international education in schools,” and “On the manifestation of kulaks’ nationalism on the cultural and ideological fronts of the Volga German ASSR.”¹⁸ These documents stressed that the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany had led to the mobilization of German “counterrevolutionary bourgeois-nationalistic elements.” It was brought to everyone’s attention that in schools, colleges and cultural institutions fascists were using tactics of “national disguise” by, for example, “fouling textbooks with nationalism,” promoting “ideologically inappropriate” national songs, “forcing out internationalism” from school curriculum, literary works, plays, etc., stirring

up national strife among youth, and activating “religious scum.” Communists were expected to exercise “heightened vigilance” and “deliver a devastating merciless blow to local German nationalism.” These directives paved the way for persecution and bans of German national customs, traditions, and cultural trends. Famous scientists, educators, authors and artists were accused of “nationalism,” arrested and subjected to repressions, and their works were banned and destroyed. Teachers who constituted the majority of German intellectuals suffered the most.

In 1932, after the publication of Stalin’s letter on the study of Communist Party history, a massive ideological campaign was started to revise the history of the Volga German Republic and its communist organization. Attempts were made to adjust this history to the dogmatic pattern invented by Stalin, which resulted in eliminating everything related to the unique national specific features. Many historical events, facts, and personalities were reevaluated. The history of German autonomy became the primary target of the falsification. The Warenburg Congress of representatives of the Volga colonies in 1918 was now presented as a gathering of German bourgeoisie and kulaks.¹⁹ The Volga German Socialists Union²⁰ was declared a counterrevolutionary Menshevik-Trotskyist organization that prevented Bolsheviks from winning over the German colonies. All the Union leaders, including A. Emich, were labeled as counterrevolutionaries, ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, and a “nationalistic counterrevolutionary league.” Any mention of the fact that the communist organization of the Volga German Autonomy emerged as part of the Union of Socialists, and became a separate organization only in the fall of 1918, was eradicated. It was unequivocally affirmed that the Bolshevik organization of the Volga colonies was founded before the October Revolution and mobilized the German proletariat and poor peasants in the bitter struggle against the German bourgeoisie, kulaks and Mensheviks; and it was the Bolsheviks who established Soviet power in the Volga area and initiated German autonomy. The period of “war communism” and “surplus appropriation” was declared a period of “furious class struggle of the proletariat and poorest peasants with brutal counterrevolutionary German kulaks for bread.” The peasant revolts of 1921 were reframed as “counterrevolutionary mutinies of kulaks and Esers.”²¹

While the “new” falsified history of the German ASSR and its communist party was heavily promoted with the help of propaganda, earlier published books and articles about the history of the German Republic were prohibited. Historians who could not “transform” their views fast enough were subjected to persecution. On 6 January 1932, at the joint meeting of the Communist Party Oblast Committee Bureau and Oblast Revision Board of the Volga German Republic, the historical works by Johannes Schmidt, *Our Party Organization*,²² and David Schmidt, *Essays on the History of the Volga Germans*,²³ were condemned for their “pro-kulak, Menshevik and Eser mood.” The meeting resolution called for the books “to be considered harmful and withdrawn from circulation.” Johannes Schmidt was expelled from the Communist Party. A special Board on “the revision of literature on the history of the Volga German Republic”²⁴ was established which resulted in dozens of books by German authors to be lost forever. Only a few copies of some books, for example, *Essays on the History of the Volga Germans* by David Schmidt, have survived until today.

Almost two years later, at a closed meeting on 28 December 1933, the Oblast Party Committee Bureau of the ASSR dismissed Alexander Eirich as the head of the Cultural and Propaganda Department of the Oblast Committee because he published the article, “Fight for the Soviets.” The article was dedicated to the 15th Anniversary of the German Republic and published in the newspapers *Nachrichten* and *Trudovaya Pravda (Labor Truth)*. The Bureau found that this was an “opportunistic” article that “falsified” the history of establishing the Volga German Communist organization. For the same reason, the statistical digest, *The Results of the Economic Growth of the ASSR VG over 15 Years*, published by the State Plan of the ASSR VG was banned and confiscated. The authors of the digest were punished.²⁵

Apparently, the historians who wrote about the background of the German Republic could not grasp the essence of Stalin’s idea of the historical process and continued to make “errors.” In 1934, as a way to clarify Stalin’s directives, the official “theoretician,” A. Loos, was commissioned by the Communist leadership to write a book titled, *Against the Falsifying of the History*

of the Bolshevik Party in the ASSR of the Volga Germans. The book outlined the official version of the history of the Germans' Communist organization.²⁶ It was in accordance with this version that articles about the German Republic in the *Great and Small Soviet Encyclopedias* and the brochure on the 20th Anniversary of the ASSR VG were written.²⁷

From the end of 1941 until 1955 the Soviet Germans, as a “guilty” people, were subjected to repressions and deprived of the opportunity to develop and preserve their national identity and culture. In the Trudarmia (Labor Army, 1942 – 1945) and the Spetsposeleniye (Special Settlements, 1946-1955), any expression of “Germanness” could be viewed as anti-Soviet action with very serious consequences. Nikita Khrushchev’s “Thaw” brought back some very limited opportunities for the Soviet Germans to revive their national identity and culture. But the “ghost” of German nationalism did not disappear from the minds of Soviet leaders. Hence the strict boundaries and censorship of all the steps to recover the German ethos in the USSR. For example, until the end of the 1980s, only Russians were appointed to the post of the Chief Editor of the central newspaper of the Soviet Germans, *Neues Leben*. The same policy was applied to the few other German newspapers, German language radio stations, cultural centers, and other developing German institutions. “The fight against German nationalism” during the Soviet period was one of the factors that led to the mass assimilation of the Soviet ethnic Germans into Russian society and the loss of their national identity, language, and cultural traditions.

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Endnotes

1. For details see: German, AA 2007, *Nemetskaya Avtonomiya na Volge. 1918 – 1941*, MSNK-Press, pp. 12-38, 159-162, Moscow.
2. For details see: Chirko, B, ‘Nemetskie Natsionalnye Rayony I Selsovety’, *Nemtsy Rossii: Entsiklopediya*, vol. 2, pp. 632-634.
3. For details see: German, AA 2013, ‘Politika “korenizatsii” v avtonomnykh respublikakh RSFSR v 1920-e gody (na materialakh ASSR nemtsev Povolzhya)’, *Izvestiya Saratovskogo Universiteta. Novaya seriya. Seriya Istoriya. Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya*, issue 4 (vol. 13), pp.92-95.
4. *Ob obyazatelnom izuchenii russkogo yazyka v shkolkakh natsionalnykh respublik i oblastey: Postanovlenie Sovnarkoma SSSR I TsK VKP(b) ot 13 marta 1938 g.* See: GANISO (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii Saratovskoi Oblasti – The State Archive of the Modern History of Saratov Oblast), Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 4467, List 339-345.
5. Babichenko, L 1993, ‘Shestdesyat let nazad. Diplomaticheskie igry vokrug golodayushchikh nemtsev Povolzhya’, *Neues Leben*, no. 41, p. 4.
6. Ibid, p.5.
7. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 2086, List 131.
8. Babichenko, L 1993, ‘Shestdesyat let nazad. Diplomaticheskie igry vokrug golodayushchikh nemtsev Povolzhya’, *Neues Leben*, no. 41, p. 5, *Nash otvet: rabochie i kolkhozniki Respubliki nemtsev Povolzhya razoblachayut klevetu germanskikh fashistov 1933*, Partizdat, p. 60, Stalingrad.
9. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 52, List 42.
10. For the full text of the directive see: German, AA 1994, *Nemetskaya Avtonomiya na Volge. 1918 – 1941. Part 2. Avtonomnaya Respublika. 1924-1941*, Saratov University Publishing, pp. 332-333, Saratov.
11. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 2294, List 1, 2, 64.
12. GANISO, Fond 594, Opis 1, Delo 52, L 40.
13. See: German, AA 2007, *Nemetskaya Avtonomiya na Volge. 1918 – 1941*, MSNK-Press, pp. 12-38, 159-162, Moscow; Belkovets, LP 1995, “Bolshoi terror” i sudby nemetskoj derevni v Sibiri (konets 1920-kh – 1930-e g.g.), Gotika, p. 183, Moscow; Chentsov, VV 1998, *Tragicheskie sudby: Politicheskie repressii protiv nemetskogo naseleniya Ukrainy v 1920 – 1930 gody*, Gotika, pp. 68 – 93, Moscow.
14. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 3056, List 112 – 114.
15. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 3071, List 1 – 5.

16. For more details on the NKVD "German Operation" see: Okhotin, N & Roginsky, A 1999, 'Iz istorii "nemetskoi operatsii" NKVD 1937 – 1938 gg.', *Nakazannyi narod: Repressii protiv rossiiskikh nemtsev*, Zveniya, pp. 35 – 37, Moscow.
17. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 3408, List 35 – 51, 61, 75 – 99.
18. The full texts of the mentioned directives were published for the first time by the author. See: German, AA 1994, *Nemetskaya Avtonomiya na Volge. 1918 – 1941. Part 2. Avtonomnaya Respublika. 1924-1941*, Saratov University Publishing, pp. 333 - 341 Saratov.
19. The Warenburg Congress of the representatives of the left bank ("meadow side") of Saratov Volga area (Novouzensky and Nikolaevsky uezds of Samarskaya gubernia) colonies was initiated by the German employees of Novouzensky uezd zemstvo organizations with the goal of the Volga Germans self-determination. It was held on 24 – 28 February 1918 in the large German colony of Warenburg. The documents issued by the Congress reflected contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the delegates denounced outrageous actions of the Red Army brigades in the German villages. Requisition of food, cattle and other assets was practically sanctioned by the local Bolshevik administration. The Congress also adopted resolutions against the closure of the "Saratov German People's Newspaper" by the Saratov Soviet and requisition of 30 thousand Rubles worth of paper; against the persecution of the German national movement activists. On the other hand, inspired by the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia", the Congress delegates decided to send a petition to the Soviet government requesting to grant territorial autonomy to the Volga Germans. See: German, AA 2007, *Nemetskaya Avtonomiya na Volge. 1918 – 1941*, MSNK-Press, pp. 19-21.
20. The Volga German Socialists Union (SNSP, "sotsbund") was an "umbrella" public and political organization of the Volga Germans comprising different groups and factions that reflected the views of almost all of the Russia socialist parties. The most influential groups were "Mensheviks" from Katharinenstadt and "Bolsheviks" from Saratov. The Union was established in May of 1917 at the constituent assembly in Saratov. It was dominated by Katharinenstadt socialists who were elected to the Central Committee (A. Emich, G. Kalinichenko, F. Lederer, and others). The first issue of the Union's newspaper "Der Kolonist" was published in Katharinenstadt in March of 1917. The Union had no clear organizational structure, membership or program. For more details on the Volga German Socialists Union, see: Hermann, A 1992, 'Wie die Arbeitskommune (das Autonome Gebiet) gegründet wurde', *Die Russlanddeutschen Gestern und Heute*, Markus Verlag, pp. 159 – 183, Köln.
21. GANISO, Fond1, Opis 1, Delo 1991, List 262 – 264; Delo 2116, List 11 – 15, 21 – 22.
22. Schmidt, J 1928, *Unsere Parteiorganisation. 1918-1928*, Deutscher Staatsverlag Nemgosisdat, p.36, Pokrowsk.
23. Schmidt, D 1930, *Studien über die Geschichte der Wolgadeutschen. Erster Teil*, Nemgosisdat, p.386, Pokrowsk.
24. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 1737, List 468.
25. GANISO, Fond 1, Opis 1, Delo 1991, List 262 – 264; Opis 1a, Osobaya Papka (Special Folder), Delo 1, List 136.
26. See: Loos, A 1934, *Gegen die Fälschung der Geschichte der Bolschewistischen Parteiorganisation der ASSR der Wolgadeutschen*, Parteiverlag, p.55, Engels.
27. *Avtonomnaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika Nemtsev Povolzhiya: Politiko-ekonomicheskij ocherk* 1938, Nemgosisdat, p. 55, Engels.